In this paper, we show that neutral monotonic social functions and their specializations to social decision functions, quasi-transitive social decision functions, and social welfare functions can be uniquely represented as a collection of overlapping simple games, each of which is defined on a nonempty set of concerned individuals. Moreover, each simple game satisfies certain intersection conditions depending on the number of social alternatives; the number of individuals belonging to the concerned set under consideration; and the collective rationaly assumption.
Preface
I first met Julian Blau at the i 977 Public Choice Meetings in New Orleans. As I recall he chaired the session where I presented an earlier version of what was to become the joint paper presented here.
At those same meetings, John Ferejohn and Peter Fishburn presented their joint paper on the representation of social decision functions, see [4] , possibly in the same session as my paper.
I remember several long walks with Julian where we discussed extensions of my paper in the direction of the Ferejohn-Fishburn paper, but emphasizing the role of neutrality. Ferejohn and Fishburn had not assumed neutrality, but the importance of neutrality in social choice theory had been a dominant theme in Julian's earlier researches, see [2] . It was during these conversations that our collaboration began. Over the next year, we corresponded and talked over the phone, I am sorry now that ! didn't save those letters. Julian was a perfectionist and we argued long and hard over definitions -he didn't like the term direct sum of games -and proofs.
Introduction
The axiomatic analysis of the aggregation of individual preferences, initiated by Arrow [1 ], has led to partial characterizations of special classes of social functions, collective choice rules which aggregate profiles of weak orderings into asymmetric social preferences.
The most celebrated result is Arrow's Possibility Theorem, where it is shown that any social welfare function, a social function whose range is the family of weak orderings, which satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition and the weak Pareto principle must be dictatorial.1 That is, under these conditions, there exists some individual who if he prefers the social alternative a over the social alternative b, can ensure that the social preference is a over b. Blau and Deb [2] have shown that any social decision function, a social function whose range is the family of acyclic preferences, which is neutral and monotonic has a veto hierarchy. 2 A veto hierarchy is a finite partition II1, V2 .... , Vt of the set of individuals such that: each V~ is nonempty; each member of V1 has a veto; for r > 2, r--1 each member of Vr has a veto when all members of U Vi are indifferent. i=1 Guha [6] has given a complete characterization of quasi-transitive social decision functions, a social function whose range is the family of quasi-transitive preferences, which satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, the strong Pareto principle, and UII, i.e., if there is unanimous indifference between a and b, then a and b are socially indifferent. Under these conditions, he has shown that each nonempty set of concerned individuals contains an oligarchy. An individual is concerned about the pair of alternatives {a, b} if he is not indifferent between them. A subset of a concerned set of individuals is an oligarchy if each person in the oligarchy has a veto, i.e., if he prefers a to b then society does not prefer b to a, and if everyone in the oligarchy prefers a to b then the social preference is a over b. Guha also established the converse of this result.
In this paper, we extend Guha's characterization to the class of neutral monotonic social functions? We show that neutral monotonic social functions and their specializations to quasi-transitive social decision functions, social decision
